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The NCAA’s Restitution Rule:
Bulwark Against Cheating or Barrier
to Appropriate Legal Remedies?
Brian L. Porto*
INTRODUCTION

The overarching question posed by this Symposium is
whether courts or some other independent body should review the
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA” or the
“Association”) “enforcement actions,” namely decisions that punish
alleged rule violations by individuals and institutions. Typically,
when journalists and scholars refer to NCAA enforcement they
mean the process conducted by the Association’s Committee on
Infractions (“COI”) and Infractions Appeals Committee (“IAC”),
respectively, in which the accused parties are institutions and
their employees.1 This process, which can result in coaches and
other institutional employees losing their jobs and college athletic
programs incurring significant penalties, has long been the
subject of criticism by journalists and academics for failing to treat
accused parties fairly.2
But NCAA enforcement also encompasses decisions
* Professor, Vermont Law School. J.D., Indiana University (Bloomington),
1987; Ph.D. (Political Science), Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A.,
University of Rhode Island, 1974.
1. See generally Brian L. Porto, New Rules for an Old Game: Recent
Changes to the NCAA Enforcement Process and Some Suggestions for the
Future, 92 OR. L. REV. 1057 (2014).
2. See, eg., id. I have been one of the critics of the NCAA’s enforcement
process, most extensively in BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN
COLLEGE SPORTS (2012).
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concerning the eligibility of individual athletes to compete,
particularly decisions of the Committee on Student-Athlete
Reinstatement (“Reinstatement Committee”), which hears appeals
by institutions seeking the restoration of competitive eligibility for
athletes previously declared ineligible.3 The NCAA requires
member institutions to certify the eligibility of their athletes4 and
to withhold from competition those athletes determined to be
ineligible for academic, disciplinary, or other reasons consistent
with the Association’s bylaws.5 If the athlete is to be reinstated,
the institution, after having withheld him or her from competition,
must conclude that “the circumstances warrant restoration of
eligibility” and then appeal, on the athlete’s behalf, to the
Reinstatement Committee.6
Concerning individual eligibility decisions, NCAA Bylaw
19.13, the Restitution Rule, which is the subject of this Article,
looms large for athletes and institutions alike.
If the
Reinstatement Committee denies the request to restore eligibility,
the Restitution Rule will make the athlete think twice about
seeking redress in court. The rule provides that if an athlete
obtains an injunction from a trial court preventing the NCAA from
keeping him or her off the field or court, but then an appellate
court reverses the injunction, the NCAA may extend the period of
ineligibility and punish the athlete’s institution retroactively for
letting the athlete compete while the injunction was in effect.7
The best evidence of the Restitution Rule’s power as a deterrent to
college athletes seeking injunctions is that, although the rule has
been in effect since 1975, the NCAA has only invoked it once.8
Because of the Restitution Rule, trial courts have been reluctant
to grant injunctions in eligibility disputes, and universities have
told athletes they will not honor an injunction granted by a trial
court for fear that its subsequent reversal on appeal would trigger
severe penalties from the NCAA.9
3. See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.12.1, at 85
(2014), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
D115.pdf [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL].
4. Id. art. 12.10.1, at 84.
5. Id. art. 12.11.1, at 85.
6. Id. art. 12.12.1, at 85.
7. Id. art. 19.13, at 329–30.
8. See Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976).
9. See infra Part II.B, note 81.
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Not surprisingly, in light of its power to blunt the effect of a
court order, the Restitution Rule is controversial. It is criticized
for interfering with judicial power by denying athletes access to
the courts, or at least discouraging them from seeking judicial
relief, and for spurring institutions to disregard injunctions
favoring athletes for fear of being punished by the NCAA if the
injunction is vacated on appeal.10 On the other hand, some defend
the rule because it discourages institutions from using ineligible
players by ensuring that institutions are punished for doing so.11
The clash of viewpoints raises the question whether the
Restitution Rule is worth preserving to prevent institutions from
seeking a competitive advantage by using ineligible players, or
instead, is an impediment to fairness that should be eliminated.
This Article argues that although the Restitution Rule serves
legitimate goals, these goals can still be achieved with judicial
authority remaining intact by submitting NCAA eligibility
disputes to binding arbitration, thereby eliminating the need for
the Restitution Rule.
Part I of this Article discusses the origins and principal
features of the Restitution Rule. Part II explains how the rule
operates in practice and the arguments both for and against it.
Part III addresses the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene
in the operations of private associations, which accounts for the
continued viability of the rule. Part IV presents alternative
proposals for supplanting the rule, although it emphasizes binding
arbitration as the best means of doing so. Part V concludes that
binding arbitration should be the exclusive method of resolving
disputes between institutions and the NCAA regarding an
athlete’s eligibility for competition.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESTITUTION RULE

A. Provisions and Consequences
The Restitution Rule is codified in NCAA Bylaw 19.13.12 It
states as follows:
If a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I.
Id.
D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, at 329–30.
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the constitution, bylaws or other legislation of the
Association is permitted to participate in intercollegiate
competition contrary to such NCAA legislation but in
accordance with the terms of a court restraining order or
injunction operative against the institution attended by
such student-athlete or against the Association, or both,
and said injunction is voluntarily vacated, stayed or
reversed or it is finally determined by the courts that
injunctive relief is not or was not justified, the Board of
Directors may take any one or more of the following
actions against such institution in the interest of
restitution and fairness to competing institutions:
(a) Require that [the athlete’s] individual records
and performances achieved during participation by
such ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or
stricken;
(b) Require that team records and performances
achieved during participation by such ineligible
student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken;
(c) Require that team victories achieved during
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall
be abrogated and the games or events forfeited to the
opposing institutions;
(d) Require that individual awards earned during
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall
be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the
competing institution supplying same;
(e) Require that team awards earned during
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall
be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the
competing institution supplying same;
(f) Determine that the institution is ineligible for
one or more NCAA championships in the sports and
in the seasons in which such ineligible studentathlete participated;
(g) Determine that the institution is ineligible for
invitational and postseason meets and tournaments
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in the sports and in the seasons in which such
ineligible student-athlete participated;
(h) Require that the institution shall remit to the
NCAA the institution’s share of television receipts
(other than the portion shared with other conference
members) for appearing on any live television series
or program if such ineligible student-athlete
participates in the contest(s) selected for such
telecast, or if the Board of Directors concludes that
the institution would not have been selected for such
telecast but for the participation of such ineligible
student-athlete during the season of the telecast; any
such funds thus remitted shall be devoted to the
NCAA postgraduate scholarship program; and
(i) Require that the institution that has been
represented in an NCAA championship by such a
student-athlete shall be assessed a financial penalty
as determined by the Committee on Infractions.13
Thus, the Restitution Rule can have adverse consequences for
individual athletes, teams, and institutions. Athletes can see
their individual records erased, and teams can see their
championship seasons eviscerated and their eligibility for future
championships taken from them.14 Most importantly, in the
money-centered world of big-time college sports, institutions can
be denied future financial rewards by being barred from upcoming
championships and can be forced to pay financial penalties for the
past participation of an ineligible player, even when a then-valid
court order authorized that participation.15
B. Defenders and Detractors
Despite its potentially severe consequences for individuals
and institutions, the Restitution Rule has been the subject of
scant litigation and academic commentary.16 Perhaps that is
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 19.13(a)–(c), at 330.
15. Id. art. 19.13(f)–(h), at 330.
16. The cases in which the NCAA’s Restitution Rule has figured most
prominently are National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77

PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2015 2:16 PM

340 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:335
because the NCAA has used the rule only once since its adoption
in 1975.17 In the spring of 1976, the Association invoked the rule
against Oregon State University following a reversal by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of a
preliminary injunction issued previously by a federal district
court.18 The case involved Lonnie Shelton, a standout basketball
player at Oregon State, who had forfeited his amateur status by
signing a professional basketball contract in June 1975.19 The
University declared Shelton ineligible before the start of the 1975–
76 college season, but he played anyway, thanks to the district
court’s order.20 The NCAA appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court.21 Thereafter, the NCAA invoked the
Restitution Rule and required Oregon State to vacate all of the
individual records and performances Shelton achieved (and his
team’s record) during his ineligibility.22
According to one commentator, the use of the Restitution Rule
just once in four decades is a testament to its effectiveness at
“curtailing [NCAA] members’ and college athletes’ injunctive
claims, and the success of those claims, against the NCAA.”23 The
rule has achieved its drafters’ aim—to stem the rising tide of
lawsuits being filed against the NCAA in the 1970s, which had
increased in number from two to twenty-five between 1971 and
1974.24 The drafters were especially eager to deter athletes’

(Ky. 2001) and Oliver v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203
(Ohio C.P. 2009). In the latter, an Ohio trial court invalidated the
Restitution Rule as violating the plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to
the courts, but a subsequent settlement by the parties negated that decision,
thereby preserving the rule. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d 203, vacated pursuant to
settlement (Sept. 30, 2009). For scholarly commentary on the rule, see
Richard G. Johnson, Submarining Due Process: How the NCAA Uses Its
Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of Their Right of Access to the
Court . . . Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459 (2010) and
Stephen F. Ross et al., Judicial Review of NCAA Eligibility Decisions:
Evaluation of the Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration, 40 J.C. & U.L.
79 (2014).
17. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 504.
18. Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 1198; see also Johnson, supra note 16, at 504.
20. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 504–05.
21. Shelton, 539 F.2d at 1199.
22. Johnson, supra note 16, at 505.
23. Id. at 520.
24. See id. at 474.
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requests for injunctive relief, namely temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions.25
They have succeeded in
spectacular fashion.
Still, the Restitution Rule is limited in its reach. It applies
only to eligibility disputes involving individual athletes, not to
NCAA enforcement proceedings against institutions or athletic
department employees.26
And it is connected to a larger
enterprise: the work of the Reinstatement Committee, which is in
charge of reinstating eligible athletes previously declared
ineligible for having violated Association rules.27 Under NCAA
bylaws, an ineligible athlete may seek restoration of eligibility,
provided the athlete’s institution is willing to appeal to the
Reinstatement Committee on his or her behalf.28 Frequently,
time is of the essence regarding these types of requests because
the athlete is seeking to have eligibility restored for a fastapproaching game, meet, or tournament.29
The Reinstatement Committee delegates to the NCAA’s
reinstatement staff the initial authority to process requests for
restoration of eligibility—subject to guidelines established by the
committee—and with a provision for the committee to hear
appeals from the staff’s decision.30 Neither the staff nor the
committee conducts an investigation or engages in independent
fact-finding; rather, each body evaluates the athlete’s
responsibility for the rule violation based on information the
institution provides and, in turn, decides whether the athlete’s
eligibility may be restored and, if so, how restoration should
occur.31 An athlete would be most likely to seek a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction permitting a return

25. See id. at 477.
26. See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, 329–30. Indeed, the
Restitution Rule is contained in just one article, 19.13, within the larger
entity, Bylaw 19, which encompasses the NCAA’s entire enforcement
program.
27. See Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation,
Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and
the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 261 (2010).
28. D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.12.1, at 85; see also id. art.
12.11.1, at 85.
29. PORTO, supra note 2, at 286.
30. Id. at 285.
31. Id. at 286.
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to competition immediately after an unfavorable decision by the
Reinstatement Committee. If the trial court granted injunctive
relief, the NCAA would presumably appeal, thereby enabling
invocation of the Restitution Rule if the appellate court were to
overturn the injunction.32
Despite its capacity to blunt the impact of a court order and
its potentially harsh consequences for individuals and institutions,
the Restitution Rule has its defenders. For example, in 2004,
then-Tulane University law professor Gary Roberts testified about
the rule to a Congressional subcommittee investigating the
NCAA’s enforcement process.33 He stated as follows:
If an institution were not subject to penalties in such a
situation, coaches could recruit a number of ineligible
players, seek short-term injunctions just before important
contests from local judges who often act out of partisan or
parochial interests, and then allow players to participate
to the substantial competitive advantage of the team (and
unfair disadvantage to its opponents), all without any
fear of subsequent penalty when the appellate courts
inevitably reverse the injunction.34
But, the rule’s critics are equally outspoken. For example, the
Ohio trial court in Oliver v. NCAA, which struck down the rule
before the parties’ settlement negated its decision, stated that
“[t]he [NCAA] may title [then] Bylaw 19.7 ‘Restitution,’ but it is
still punitive in its achievement, and it fosters a direct attack on
the constitutional right of access to courts.”35 Later in its opinion,
the Ohio court commented on the difficult choice the rule forced on
institutions between honoring a court order, thereby facing NCAA
penalties, or disregarding a court order to avoid such penalties.36
The court wrote:
Such a bylaw is governed by no fixed standard except
that which is self-serving for the [NCAA]. To that extent,
32. See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, at 229–30.
33. See Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 108th
Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Gary Roberts, Deputy Dean & Dir. of Sports
Law, Tulane Law School).
34. Id.
35. 920 N.E.2d 203, 216 (Ohio C.P. 2009).
36. Id.
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it is arbitrary and indeed a violation of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contract with
the plaintiff [athlete], as the third-party beneficiary [of
the contract between the NCAA and the athlete’s
institution].37
Despite the clarity of the conflicting viewpoints expressed
above, the best way to assess the merits and demerits of the
Restitution Rule is to observe it in operation in the few cases in
which it has played a role. That is the focus of Part II, which
follows.
II. THE RESTITUTION RULE IN COURT

A. NCAA v. Lasege
The Restitution Rule figured prominently in National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege.38
In that case, the
Reinstatement Committee upheld a finding by the reinstatement
staff that a Nigerian citizen had violated NCAA rules by playing
professional basketball in Russia before enrolling at the
University of Louisville.39 Both NCAA entities concluded that the
athlete’s violation of Association bylaws against professionalism,
by accepting cash and other benefits in exchange for his basketball
services, reflected a clear intent to become a professional, thereby
rendering him ineligible for intercollegiate competition.40
Mr. Lasege sought injunctive relief in a Kentucky trial court,
which agreed with him that any violations of NCAA rules he
committed occurred only to obtain a visa that would enable him to
become a student in the United States, not a professional athlete
in Russia.41 The trial court also invalidated the Restitution Rule,
reasoning that it prevents parties from availing themselves of
appropriate legal protections.42 The court’s injunction enabled
Lasege to play for Louisville during the 2000–01 college basketball
season.43
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001).
Id. at 80–81.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the injunction,44 but
the Kentucky Supreme Court later vacated the injunction in its
entirety, including the portion that prohibited the NCAA from
invoking the Restitution Rule.45
Regarding the rule, the
Kentucky Supreme Court observed:
Perhaps the trial court believed that NCAA Bylaw 19.8
[which housed the rule in 2001] would deter aggrieved
student-athletes from seeking judicial redress because of
fears that their efforts would only hurt their teams in the
long run. Perhaps the trial court believed that the bylaw
created a disincentive for NCAA member institutions to
allow players whose eligibility has not yet been finally
adjudicated to play in games or other athletic events.46
Noting the existence of comparable rules in high school
sports, the Court continued:
NCAA Bylaw 19.8, like the Restitution Rules enforced by
many state high school athletic associations, ‘does not
purport to authorize interference with any court order
during the time it remains in effect, but only authorizes
restitutive penalties when a temporary restraining order
is ultimately dissolved and the challenged eligibility rule
remains undisturbed in force.’47
Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the
Restitution Rule does not compromise judicial authority, but
instead, “merely allows for post-hoc equalization when a trial
court’s erroneously granted temporary injunction upsets
competitive balance.”48
B. Bloom v. NCAA
1. The Litigation
The Restitution Rule was not as prominent in the outcome of
Bloom v. NCAA as it was in Lasege, but in Plaintiff Jeremy
44. Id.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id. at 88.
47. Id. (quoting Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 467 N.W.2d 21, 22 (1991)).
48. Id.
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Bloom’s mind, it was the 800-pound gorilla in the trial judge’s
chambers that silently directed the judge to deny Bloom’s request
for injunctive relief.49 In 2002, Jeremy Bloom faced a delicious
dilemma. Before enrolling that year at the University of Colorado,
Bloom had competed in Olympic and World Cup skiing events and
had become the World Cup Champion in freestyle moguls.50
During the 2002 Olympics, he appeared on MTV and was offered
various paid entertainment opportunities; he also agreed to
endorse certain ski equipment and model Tommy Hilfiger
clothing.51
Bloom’s dilemma derived from his athletic versatility; besides
being a world-class ski racer, he was a talented football player.52
Bloom had relinquished his endorsement and media opportunities
in order to be eligible for collegiate football because NCAA rules
prohibited athletes from accepting endorsement income, even
when that income came from a sport other than the one the
athlete played in college.53
Acting on Bloom’s behalf, the
University of Colorado first requested waivers of NCAA rules
restricting endorsements and media activities by athletes and
later sought a favorable interpretation of the rule on media
activities, but the NCAA denied these requests.54 Accordingly,
Bloom ceased his endorsement, modeling, and media activities to
play football during the 2002 and 2003 seasons.55 In 2004,
though, with the next Olympics approaching in two years, he
49. Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004).
50. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622. Freestyle, moguls skiing combines the bumpy
terrain of moguls competition with the jumps, flips, and twists of freestyle
events.
See Mogul skiing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Mogul_skiing (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
51. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.
52.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Bloom’s exploits on the football field showed why the University
of Colorado had sought a waiver of NCAA rules that would have allowed him
to play football while earning endorsement income. See Gordon Gouveia,
Making a Mountain Out of a Mogul: Jeremy Bloom v. NCAA and Unjustified
Denial of Compensation Under NCAA Amateurism Rules, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L.
& PRAC. 22, 22 (2005). For example, as a freshman, he made an immediate
impact on the Buffaloes’ gridiron fortunes with a 94-yard pass reception—the
longest in school history—and an 80-yard punt return for a touchdown. See
id. The punt return occurred against Oklahoma in the 2002 Big-12
championship game. See id.
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resumed those activities in order to pay the expenses associated
with his ski training.56 In an effort to remain eligible for football
while engaged in commercial activities, he sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the NCAA in the Colorado courts.57
Specifically, Bloom sought to enjoin the NCAA from punishing
him for participating in those activities because: (1) he had
pursued them before enrolling in college, and (2) they were
entirely unrelated to his football prowess.58 The trial court denied
his request, reasoning that although he was a third-party
beneficiary of the NCAA’s contractual relationship with the
University of Colorado (hence he had standing to challenge NCAA
rules), his claims did not warrant a preliminary injunction under
Colorado law.59 Such was the case because he satisfied only three
parts of Colorado’s six-part test for preliminary injunctions; he
could show: (1) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury
that may be prevented by injunctive relief; (2) the lack of a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law; and (3) the likelihood that
an injunction would preserve the status quo pending a trial on the
merits.60 But he could not show that: (4) he had a reasonable
probability of success on the merits; (5) granting him an injunction
would serve the public interest; and (6) the balance of equities
favored granting the injunction.61
Bloom appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
after reviewing his claims for breach of contract and arbitrary and

56. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 623. The third-party beneficiary rule drops contract law’s
traditional privity requirement by permitting one who is not a party to a
contract to enforce its terms nonetheless. See Joel Eckert, Note, StudentAthlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV.
905, 928 (2006) (citing RICHARD A. LORD, 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1
(Jack K. Levin ed., 4th ed. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
304, 310 (1981)). Third parties can thus enforce a contract to the same extent
as a traditional party in privity if they are intended beneficiaries because the
promisor has a duty to any intended beneficiaries to perform the promise.
See id. In most cases, the third-party beneficiary’s claim will be against the
promisor. See id. Still, the promisee can be liable to the third-party
beneficiary if the promisee is responsible for the breach, either jointly or
individually. See id.
60. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623.
61. Id.
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capricious action by the NCAA.62 Like the trial court, the
appellate court agreed that Bloom was a third-party beneficiary of
the NCAA’s contractual relationship with the University of
Colorado, and therefore, he had standing to challenge the
Association’s bylaws.63 Key to Bloom’s case was his reasoning
that NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 permitted a college student to be a
professional in one sport, yet an amateur in his or her college
sport.64 In Bloom’s view, because a professional athlete is simply
one who “gets paid” for playing a sport, the NCAA should permit
him to play college football while earning whatever income is
“customary” in his sport, namely endorsement income.65
The appellate court disagreed, observing that, although
NCAA rules permitted one to play a college sport as an amateur
while earning a salary from playing professionally in another
sport, no NCAA bylaw identified a right to receive “customary
income” for playing a sport.66 On the contrary, the court noted,
NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1 specifically prohibited college athletes from
receiving money for advertisements and endorsements.67
In the court’s view, these bylaws taken together, show a
clear . . . intent to prohibit student-athletes from
engaging in endorsements . . . without regard to: (1) when
the opportunity for such activities originated; (2) whether
the opportunity arose or exists for reasons unrelated to
participation in an amateur sport; and (3) whether

62. Id. at 622, 623.
63. Id. at 623–24.
64. The current version of this rule is Bylaw 15.3.1.4, which states, “[a]
professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a
different sport and may receive institutional financial assistance in the
second sport.” D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.1.4, at 195.
65. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 625.
66. Id.
67. Id. This bylaw is still in effect under the same number. It states:
After becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible
for participation in Intercollegiate athletics if the individual:
(a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her
name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the
sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind; or
(b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or
service through the individual’s use of such product or service.
D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.5.2.1, at 71.
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income derived from the opportunity is customary for any
particular professional sport.68
Therefore, although college athletes have the right to be
professional athletes in other sports, “they do not have the right to
simultaneously engage in endorsement or paid media activity and
maintain their eligibility to participate in amateur competition.”69
The court added that despite the disparate impact of Bylaws
12.1.2 and 12.5.2.1 on, say, minor league baseball players, who
earned salaries, and skiers, who earned only endorsement income,
it could not ignore the clear language of those bylaws “simply
because they may disproportionately affect those who participate
in individual professional sports.”70
Moreover, the court noted that the bylaws’ prohibition on
income from endorsements and media activities was rationally
related to the NCAA’s stated purpose of maintaining a “clear line
of demarcation” between college and professional sports.71
According to the court, permitting Mr. Bloom to endorse products
and be paid for doing so could “open the door” to the commercial
exploitation of athletes in other sports.72 Furthermore, permitting
him to be paid for entertainment activities, such as hosting a
television show, would make it difficult “to determine which of
Bloom’s requested activities were, in fact, unrelated to his athletic
ability,”73 which NCAA rules prohibited him from using to obtain
commercial opportunities.74
68. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.01.2,
at 59 (2013)).
72. Id. at 627.
73. Id.
74. Under current Bylaw 12.5.1.3, a college athlete may continue
modeling and other promotional activities unrelated to athletics begun before
entering college if, among other criteria, “[t]he [athlete] became involved in
such activities for reasons independent of athletics ability; . . . [and t]he
[athlete] does not endorse the commercial product” involved. D-1 MANUAL,
supra note 3, art. 12.5.1.3(b),(d), at 69. The Bloom court’s concern in this
regard was that, although Mr. Bloom’s pre-college commercial ventures may
have resulted only from his skiing prowess, any such activities in which he
might engage during college could derive as much from his status as a college
football player as from his skiing fame. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 627. In that case,
it would be difficult to determine whether or not he was in violation of NCAA
rules.
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Finally, the court pointed out that Bloom had failed to show
any arbitrariness or inconsistency in the way the NCAA applied
its rules in his case or any unfair treatment in its denial of his
request for a waiver of those rules.75 Thus, the court agreed with
the trial court’s reasoning that he had not demonstrated a
reasonable probability of success on the merits and affirmed the
denial of his request for an injunction.76 Because it affirmed the
trial court’s decision, the appellate court did not need to address
the validity of the Restitution Rule.77
2.

The Aftermath: Bloom’s Congressional Testimony

Jeremy Bloom certainly addressed the Restitution Rule in
subsequent testimony before a congressional subcommittee. In
September 2004, Bloom told the subcommittee:
In my experience, this restitution bylaw brought much
concern to the [trial] judge who heard my case as well as
spurred university officials to notify me that, even if I
were granted injunctive relief by the court, that the
university would not take the risk of allowing me to play
for fear of possible sanctions.78
To make his point, Bloom quoted the portion of the trial
judge’s opinion that sought to determine whether granting the
injunction would serve the public interest.79 Toward that end, the
judge weighed the relative harms to Mr. Bloom and the University
of Colorado that would result from a decision granting the
injunction.80 The trial judge wrote:
The harm to CU . . . would be that an injunction
mandating that they declare Mr. Bloom eligible and allow
him to compete on the football team would risk the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to bylaw 19.8, which
would allow the NCAA to impose sanctions if an
injunction was erroneously granted. These sanctions
75. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 628.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Due Process and the NCAA Hearing, supra note 33, at 19 (statement
of Jeremy Bloom).
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id.

PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2015 2:16 PM

350 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:335
could include: forfeiture of all victories, of all titles, TV
revenue, as well as others; forfeiture of games would
irreparably harm all of the members of the CU football
team who would see their hard earned victories after
great personal sacrifice nullified; the loss of revenues
would harm all student athletes at CU who would find
their various programs less economically viable;
imposition of NCAA sanctions would harm CU’s
reputation;
and
sanctions
would
reduce
the
competitiveness of various sports teams at CU.81
After weighing the stakes for Bloom and the University,
respectively, the trial judge added, “I find that the harm to CU
and the NCAA is more far reaching, especially because it could
harm other student athletes, than the harm to Mr. Bloom.
Therefore, the public interest would not be served by an
injunction.”82
Thus, although the Restitution Rule did not play a key role in
the appellate court’s decision in Bloom v. NCAA, its likely
consequences for the University of Colorado if an injunction had
issued in Bloom’s favor nonetheless influenced the trial judge’s
decision to deny Bloom’s request for an injunction. The appellate
court relied on the reasonableness of the NCAA’s prohibition on
endorsements by athletes to resolve the case; nevertheless, its
decision affirmed the denial of an injunction request that, if
granted, could have unleashed the NCAA’s notion of “restitution”
on the University of Colorado.83
C. Oliver v. NCAA
More recently, in Oliver v. NCAA, briefly addressed above, the
Restitution Rule was front-and-center in an Ohio trial court’s
decision to grant the college-athlete plaintiff’s request to enjoin
the NCAA from keeping him off the baseball diamond.84 In May
2008, the NCAA suspended Oklahoma State University pitcher
Andy Oliver indefinitely for violating Bylaw 12.3.1, the “no-agent”
rule, by: “(1) allowing his previous attorneys to contact the
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 627 (Colo. App. 2004).
920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P. 2009).
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Minnesota Twins by telephone and (2) by allowing [one of those
attorneys] to be present in [Oliver’s Ohio] home” when a Twins
representative offered Oliver a contract.85 Oliver sued in Ohio,
and the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
reinstating him, after which Oklahoma State asked the NCAA to
reinstate him.86 Instead of reinstating him, however, the NCAA
suspended Oliver for one year and reduced his collegiate eligibility
by a year.87
On the merits of the case, the trial court attacked both the
No-Agent Rule, which Oliver had allegedly violated, and the
Restitution Rule, which would affect both Oliver and Oklahoma
State if he obtained an injunction that was later overturned on
appeal. Regarding Oliver’s claim against the No-Agent Rule, the
court first observed that Oliver, like Jeremy Bloom, was a thirdparty beneficiary of his University’s contractual relationship with
the NCAA, which entitled him to assert “a violation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing that is implied in the contractual
relationship between the NCAA and its members.”88 Therefore,
the court continued, the NCAA “was required to deal honestly and
reasonably with [Oliver] as a third-party beneficiary of its
contractual relationship.”89 Yet the No-Agent Rule, which permits
an athlete to hire a lawyer as an advisor, but prohibits the lawyer
from contacting a professional team on the athlete’s behalf and
from being present when a contract is offered, failed to satisfy
those requirements.90 In the court’s view, the rule “is unreliable
(capricious) and illogical (arbitrary) and indeed stifles what
attorneys are trained and retained to do.”91
The court reached a similar conclusion about the Restitution
Rule, observing that it not only “fosters a direct attack on the
constitutional right of access to courts,” but is also “arbitrary and
indeed a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implicit in [the NCAA’s] contract with [Oliver], as the third-party

85. Id. at 207.
86. Id.
87. Id. Later, the Association lessened the penalty to “70 percent of the
original suspension and no loss of eligibility.” Id.
88. Id. at 212.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 213–14; D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.3.2.1, at 66.
91. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 214.
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beneficiary” of the NCAA’s contractual relationship with
Oklahoma State.92 It forces an institution to either permit an
athlete to compete in accordance with a court order and face
penalties if the order is reversed on appeal, or to prohibit the
athlete from competing, thereby defying a court order and risking
a contempt-of-court citation.93
Thus, the Ohio trial court invalidated both the No-Agent Rule
and the Restitution Rule and granted Oliver a declaratory
judgment and a permanent injunction preventing the NCAA from
declaring him ineligible to compete.94 The NCAA commenced an
appeal, but before the appeal could be heard, the parties reached a
settlement whereby the NCAA paid Oliver $750,000 to end the
litigation, therefore leaving both the No-Agent Rule and the
Restitution Rule intact.95 In Oliver, then, as in Bloom, the
appellate court never addressed the legitimacy of the Restitution
Rule directly, leaving that issue for another case and another day.
D. The High School Cases
Because so few cases have considered the NCAA’s Restitution
Rule directly, it is instructive to examine those cases that have
addressed analogous rules established by state high school
athletic associations. Indeed, because the high school cases have
addressed restitution directly, they present the arguments for and
against “restitution” more clearly and completely than do the
college cases. Accordingly, the high school cases merit review and
analysis.
1.

The Cardinal Mooney Case

At issue in Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High
School Athletic Ass’n was the validity of Michigan’s Regulation V,
Section 3D (“Rule 3D”), a restitution rule similar to the NCAA’s.96
Under this rule, if a high school athlete obtained an injunction
that was vacated, stayed, or reversed on appeal, the Michigan
High School Athletic Association (“MHSAA”) could take one or
92. Id. at 216.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 206, 218–19.
95. See Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent Rule
Called Out, but Remains Safe, 17 SPORTS L. J. 303, 314 (2010).
96. 467 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Mich. 1991).
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more of the following actions against the athlete’s school:
(1)—Require that individual or team records and
performances achieved during the ineligible athlete’s
participation be vacated or stricken.
(2)—Require that team victories be forfeited to opponent.
(3)—Require that team or individual awards earned by
such ineligible student be returned to the association.97
The case arose when the MHSAA declared John McClellan, a
senior basketball player at Cardinal Mooney, ineligible for the
1987–88 season because his nineteenth birthday had occurred
before September 1, 1987.98 McClellan challenged the declaration
of ineligibility in a Michigan trial court and obtained two
temporary restraining orders, but he ultimately lost the case when
the trial court determined that the age-eligibility rule applied to
him.99
Still, the trial court prohibited the MHSAA from
penalizing McClellan or his school retroactively because he had
participated, as a second-string player, in a few games while the
temporary restraining orders were in effect.100 The Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Rule 3D was “arbitrary,
unreasonable and unlawful,” and assessed $1,500 in damages
against both the MHSAA and its counsel for filing a “vexatious”
appeal.101
The MHSAA appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which
first reversed the damage award, observing that because of the
absence of case law on athletic restitution rules, the matter was
sufficiently unsettled that a reasonable lawyer could challenge the
trial court’s ruling in good faith.102 Indeed, the Court explained,
the MHSAA was entitled to continue challenging the damage
award in hopes that “this Court would eventually grant leave to
appeal, as we have now done.”103
The Michigan Supreme Court also reversed on the merits,

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 22–23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
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finding Rule 3D “to be a valid restitutive provision.”104 In the
Court’s view, the rule was “reasonably designed to rectify the
competitive inequities that would inevitably occur if schools were
permitted without penalty to field ineligible athletes under the
protection of a temporary restraining order, pending the outcome
of an ultimately unsuccessful legal challenge to one or more
eligibility rules.”105 Furthermore, the opinion noted, the rule did
not interfere with a court order while it was in effect, and the
member schools in the state association had agreed to abide by it
as a condition of their membership.106 Thus, according to the
Michigan Supreme Court, Rule 3D was “a valid regulation which
neither infringe[d] the authority of the courts nor improperly
restrict[ed] access to the judicial system.”107 The court therefore
reversed the trial court and vacated the injunction against
enforcement of Rule 3D.108
2.

The Reyes Case

A restitution rule was also at the forefront of the Indiana
Supreme Court’s decision in Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n v.
Reyes.109 In Reyes, a high school senior who sought to play
baseball during the 1994–95 academic year was declared ineligible
under Indiana’s rule restricting high school athletes to eight
semesters of competition.110 Reyes was set to exceed the eightsemester limit because he had first enrolled in the ninth grade in
the fall of 1990 and had repeated that grade in 1991–92 at a high
school in Puerto Rico.111 After exhausting his administrative
options within the state athletic association, he sought injunctive
relief.112 An Indiana trial court issued a temporary restraining
order preventing the association from enforcing the eight-semester
rule against him.113 The trial court subsequently issued a
permanent injunction against the state athletic association and
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. 1997).
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
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prohibited it from penalizing Reyes’s high school for honoring the
injunction.114
A panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, and upheld
both the eight-semester eligibility rule and the state athletic
association’s restitution rule.115 But in a prior decision, Indiana
High School Athletic Ass’n v. Avant, a different court of appeals
panel had invalidated Indiana’s restitution rule,116 so the affected
high school in Reyes asked the Indiana Supreme Court to resolve
the apparent conflict between the two court of appeals decisions
and to adopt the position taken by the panel in Avant.117
Under Indiana’s restitution rule, which is also similar to the
NCAA’s, the state athletic association could impose one or more of
the following sanctions on a school and an athlete if the original
injunction was stayed or reversed:
(1) require [that] individual or team records and
performances achieved during participation by such
ineligible student be vacated or stricken;
(2) require
opponents;

[that]

team

victories

be

forfeited

to

(3) require [that] team or individual awards earned be
returned to the state association; and/or
(4) if the school has received or would receive any funds
from an Association tournament series in which the
ineligible individual has participated, require the school
forfeit its share of net receipts from such competition, and
if said receipts have not been [distributed], authorize the
withholding of such [receipts] by the Association.118
In its analysis, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged the
high school’s argument that the restitution rule showed
“disrespect” for the judiciary by encouraging school administrators
to defy court orders.119 But the court rejected that argument,
stating:

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
650 N.E.2d 1164, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 254, n.3.
Id. at 257.
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If a school wants to enjoy the benefits of membership in
the IHSAA, the school agrees to be subject to rule that
permits the IHSAA to require the school to forfeit
victories, trophies, titles and earnings if a trial court
improperly grants an injunction or restraining order
prohibiting enforcement of IHSAA eligibility rules. Such
an agreement shows no disrespect to the institution of the
judiciary.120
The court then analogized the operation of Indiana’s
restitution rule to the purchase of professional liability insurance
by doctors and lawyers to protect themselves from the potentially
adverse consequences of lawsuits and to the signing by couples of
prenuptial agreements specifying what will occur if a court finds
the agreement unenforceable.121 In light of the similarity between
Indiana’s restitution rule and malpractice insurance or prenuptial
agreements, the court reasoned that the former showed no
disrespect to courts.122 Rather, the rule was an acceptable means
by which the members of the state athletic association chose to
balance one team’s interest in complying with a court order and
another team’s interest in not having to compete against an
opponent using an ineligible player because a local trial court
prohibited a high school association from enforcing its eligibility
rules.123 Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals in Reyes and overturned Avant to the
extent that decision had invalidated the state athletic
association’s restitution rule.124
3.

The Carlberg Case

On the same day that the Indiana Supreme Court issued its
decision in Reyes, it also issued a decision in the companion case,
Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg.125 In Carlberg, a
trial court ordered the same state athletic association to permit a
transfer student to participate on the swim team of the transferee
high school and enjoined the enforcement of a restitution rule
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997).
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against the athlete or his school.126 The state athletic association
appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.127 It
reasoned that the association’s transfer rule, which prohibited
varsity (but not junior varsity or freshman) participation by a
transfer student for one year post-transfer unless a parental
change of address accompanied the transfer, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.128
The state athletic association appealed to the Indiana
Supreme Court, which reversed, upholding the transfer rule
because it was rationally related to the goal of preventing “school
jumping” for athletic purposes.129 The majority noted that a
rational basis test applies to an equal protection challenge to state
action when, as in this case, no constitutional right is at stake and
no suspect classification has been created.130 Regarding the trial
court’s order prohibiting enforcement of Indiana’s restitution rule,
the Carlberg majority cited and adopted the reasoning used by the
Michigan Supreme Court in the Cardinal Mooney case discussed
earlier.131 According to the Carlberg majority, the rule was
reasonably designed to rectify competitive inequities that would
result if schools could field teams with ineligible athletes, subject
to a favorable court order, pending the outcome of an ultimately
unsuccessful legal challenge to an eligibility rule.132
For present purposes, though, the importance of Carlberg lies
in the dissent penned by Justice Brent Dickson, specifically that
portion concerning Indiana’s restitution rule. In Justice Dickson’s
view, although the rule might well protect the interests of athletes
who competed against a team with an ineligible player, “it wholly
fails to protect the interests of an equally innocent set of actors:
those teammates with whom the student participated and the
schools they represented.”133 He added that when, as in this case,
a trial court issues an order enjoining a state athletic association
from prohibiting an athlete’s participation, “neither the ineligible
126. Id. at 227.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n., 467 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Mich. 1991)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 245 (Dickson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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player’s teammates nor his school are free to ignore [the] court
order.”134 Therefore, Justice Dickson concluded, to punish that
player’s teammates and school “is manifestly arbitrary and
capricious.”135 Moreover, to do so in an individual sport, like
swimming, is nonsensical because the ineligible athlete’s times or
scores can be easily deducted from team totals to determine
whether the team would have qualified for the honors it earned
even without the ineligible player’s contribution.136
E. The Limits of Restitution
The above review of litigation concerning the NCAA’s
Restitution Rule and its analogs in the high school context reveals
that, although arguments can be made in support of this type of
rule, its inequities are sufficiently severe to warrant a search for
alternatives.
After all, to achieve its aim of preventing
institutions from using ineligible players, the NCAA’s Restitution
Rule: (1) discourages athletes from pursuing legal remedies, (2)
punishes institutions that honor court-ordered injunctions,
thereby encouraging them to flout such injunctions, and (3)
penalizes the innocent teammates of the litigant whose institution
honors an injunction.137
But any effort to identify and adopt an alternative to the
Restitution Rule must take into account American courts’ historic
deference to the right of private associations to manage their
affairs as they see fit. That deference is the subject of Part III,
which follows.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 245–46.
137. Furthermore, a recent academic commentary characterizes the
Restitution Rule as a “waiver of recourse” clause that “does not preclude
access to the courts on its face, [but] effectively stops member institutions
from honoring and enforcing valid court orders and injunctions.” See Ross et
al., supra note 16, at 96. Such clauses in contracts have generally been held
to violate public policy; hence, they rarely exist absent an agreement to
arbitrate. See id. at 97-98 (citing Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d
527, 544 n.61 (7th Cir. 1978)).

PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/2/2015 2:16 PM

NCAA’S RESTITUTION RULE

359

III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS

A. Deference and Restitution
The NCAA, like other private associations, enjoys
considerable deference from courts when enforcing its rules and
regulations. Several cases illustrate this judicial deference at
work. In NCAA v. Brinkworth, a Florida appellate court reversed
a trial court order temporarily enjoining the NCAA from enforcing
its decision declaring Brinkworth ineligible to play football for the
University of Miami (“Miami”) during the 1996 season.138
Brinkworth had enrolled at Miami in 1991; so in the NCAA’s eyes,
he had exhausted his collegiate eligibility (four years of
competition within a five-year period) at the end of the 1995
season.139 Still, he sought to play in 1996 because he had been
injured in the first game of 1995 and was forced to sit out the rest
of that season.140
In rejecting Brinkworth’s claim for a waiver of the five-year
rule, the appellate court observed that “a court may intervene in
the internal affairs of a private association only in exceptional
circumstances.”141 Those circumstances occur when: (1) the
association’s action adversely affects substantial property,
contract, or other economic rights, and the association’s own
procedures were inadequate or unfair, or (2) the association acted
maliciously or in bad faith.142 In this case, the appellate court
concluded that it was not required to decide whether the NCAA’s
decision had adversely affected Brinkworth’s economic rights
because Brinkworth had failed to show that those procedures were
inadequate or unfair.143 He had sought a waiver of the five-year
eligibility rule; Miami had submitted the waiver request on his

138. 680 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 1082. See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.8.1, at 75 (“A
student-athlete shall complete his or her seasons of participation within five
calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter in which the
student-athlete first registered for a minimum full-time program of studies in
a collegiate institution . . .”).
140. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d at 1082.
141. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
142. Id. (quoting Rewolinski v. Fisher, 444 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 1082.
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behalf to the NCAA’s eligibility staff, which had denied it.144
Thereafter, he appealed to the Eligibility Committee, which
affirmed the denial.145 The court acknowledged that Brinkworth
challenged the Committee’s reliance on its 1991 waiver rule,
which was in effect when he enrolled in college, instead of its 1994
waiver rule, but concluded that the responsibility for interpreting
NCAA rules rests with the NCAA itself, not with the judiciary.146
“As the procedures were adequate and fair,” the court wrote,
“there was no basis on which to intervene in the internal affairs of
the NCAA.”147
Similarly, in Hispanic College Fund, Inc. v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the court upheld an NCAA decision
denying the Hispanic College Fund’s (“HCF”) request for a waiver
allowing it to sponsor a college football game that would be
exempt from the Association’s rule limiting member institutions to
playing twelve games per season.148 The appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s ruling that it could not interfere with the NCAA’s
decision “[a]bsent fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or
property rights having their origin elsewhere.”149 “The HCF
voluntarily subjected itself to the NCAA’s decision making
process,” the court continued, “and does not allege the NCAA’s
actions were fraudulent, otherwise illegal, or that they abused
civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere.”150
Therefore, the court declined “HCF’s invitation to interfere in the
NCAA’s internal affairs” and upheld an Association rule
establishing which organizations could sponsor early-season
games that were exempt from the cap on the number of football
games a member institution could play per season.151
In NCAA v. Lasege, alluded to earlier, in which the trial court
had granted a Nigerian basketball player an injunction permitting
him to compete for the University of Louisville, the Kentucky
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1084 (citing Rewolinski, 444 So. 2d at 58).
147. Id.
148. 826 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). See D-1 MANUAL, supra
note 3, art. 17.9.5.1, at 253.
149. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d at 655 (citing Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v.
Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ind. 1997)).
150. Id. at 658.
151. Id.
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Supreme Court granted the NCAA interlocutory relief from the
injunction.152 The justices reasoned that the trial court had
“wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of the NCAA after it
analyzed the evidence and reached a different conclusion as to
Lasege’s intent to professionalize”—by previously accepting
various benefits in return for playing basketball in Russia.153
They added that the NCAA’s decision denying eligibility was not
“arbitrary and capricious,” as the trial court had ruled, because
that decision “ha[d] strong evidentiary support—Lasege
unquestionably signed contracts to play professional basketball
and unquestionably accepted benefits.”154
Finally, in McAdoo v. University of North Carolina, the court
rejected football player Michael McAdoo’s challenge to a
November 2010 decision by the NCAA’s Reinstatement
Committee, which declared him permanently ineligible for
collegiate competition for committing academic fraud and
receiving extra benefits after he received impermissible assistance
from a former tutor on multiple assignments over the course of
several academic terms.155
In that case, a North Carolina appellate court noted, “[i]t is
well established that courts will not interfere with the internal
affairs of voluntary associations.”156 Accordingly, when a plaintiff
challenges a private association’s decision, a court will dismiss the
case as non-justiciable unless the plaintiff alleges facts showing
that: (1) the decision violated due process, or (2) the association
engaged in arbitrary behavior, fraud, or collusion.157 The court
then determined that McAdoo lacked standing because the injury
he allegedly suffered with respect to his professional football
prospects was speculative.158 More precisely, it was unclear that
his loss of college eligibility for academic reasons had caused him
152. 53 S.W.3d 77, 80, 84 (Ky. 2001).
153. Id. at 81, 85.
154. Id. at 85.
155. 736 S.E.2d 811, 814, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
156. Id. at 825 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson Realty & Constr.,
Inc. v. Asheboro-Randolph Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 28, 30 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing 6 AM. JUR. 2D Association and Clubs § 37 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
157. Id (quoting Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., 726 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2012)). This set of factors is known as the Topp test. Id.
158. Id. at 823.
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to not be selected in the National Football League draft, thereby
forcing him to sign a free-agent contract for a lesser amount than
he would have received if drafted.159 Moreover, because he had
signed a contract with the Baltimore Ravens, his claim seeking
reinstatement of collegiate eligibility had become moot.160 The
appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s order
dismissing the case.161
B. Deference Denied
Nevertheless, judicial deference to private associations in
general and the NCAA in particular is not an impregnable
fortress; indeed, courts have breached its defenses in several cases
involving collegiate sports. For example, in Gulf South Conference
v. Boyd, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a trial court order
declaring Boyd eligible to play football because his athletic
conference had violated its own rules in declaring him
ineligible.162 Boyd had played football on scholarship as a
freshman at Livingston University.163 Declining an offer of
renewal for his sophomore year, he transferred to a junior college
instead, where he later graduated but did not play football.164
When he tried to enroll for his junior year and play football at
Troy State University, which, like Livingston, belonged to the Gulf
South Conference, the conference office declared him ineligible.165
In affirming the trial court, the Alabama Supreme Court
stated boldly:
We hold that the general non-interference doctrine
concerning voluntary associations does not apply to cases
involving disputes between college athletes themselves
and college athletic associations. . . . In such cases the
athlete himself is not even a member of the athletic
association; therefore, the basic “freedom of association”
principle behind the non-interference rule is not present.
The athlete himself has no voice or bargaining power
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 826.
369 So. 2d 553, 554 (Ala. 1979).
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
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concerning the rules and regulations adopted by the
athletic associations because he is not a member, yet he
stands to be substantially affected, and even damaged, by
an association ruling declaring him to be ineligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics.166
Having freed itself from the traditional deference to private
associations, the court proceeded to examine the rule under which
the conference had declared Boyd ineligible and concluded that
the conference had violated its own rule.167 The rule provided
that if a member school declined to renew an athlete’s scholarship
or offered a renewal, but the athlete declined, the athlete was
permitted to accept an offer from another conference member.168
Moreover, a separate conference rule granted eligibility to an
athlete who declined a scholarship at one member school, did not
compete for two years, and then accepted a scholarship offer from
another member school.169 Because Boyd qualified under both
rules, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the conference had
violated its own rules in declaring him ineligible.170
The court in California State University, Hayward v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n did not find a blanket exception to the
traditional rule of judicial deference in all cases featuring athletes
and college athletic associations.171 Still, the Hayward court
echoed the Boyd court in holding that courts should intervene in
the affairs of a private association when the latter violates its own
rules.172 The Hayward case concerned the NCAA’s former “1.6
rule,” which barred from athletic competition any freshman whose
institution could not predict, based on the athlete’s high school
grade-point average and standardized test (SAT or ACT) score,
that he or she would earn at least a 1.6 grade-point average.173
The period of ineligibility would end when the athlete earned at
least a 2.0 grade-point average for ten hours of college credit.174
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
Id.
47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 543; see also Boyd, 369 So. 2d at 557.
Hayward, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 538.
Id.
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Two such athletes, a runner and a baseball player, were
ineligible for competition at California State University-Hayward
(“CSUH”) as first-semester freshmen (in the fall of 1969 and 1970,
respectively), but the University permitted them to compete in the
spring semester after they each earned at least a 2.0 average
during the fall term.175 CSUH interpreted the 1.6 rule to apply to
postseason competition only, thereby permitting a freshman “subpredictor” to compete during the regular season so long as he or
she was not allowed to compete in postseason events.176 The Far
West Conference, to which CSUH belonged, also interpreted the
rule that way, relying on a 1969 letter from the NCAA to the
commissioner of the conference.177 Consequently, CSUH was
unaware that its runner and baseball player had eligibility
problems until the NCAA published a memo in November 1972
stating that “sub-predictors” were ineligible for both regularseason and postseason competition.178
When the NCAA directed CSUH to declare the two athletes
ineligible, CSUH chose not to do so.179 Instead, CSUH appealed
on their behalf to the NCAA, which retaliated against the
University for defying it and taking up the athletes’ cause by
declaring all CSUH athletes ineligible for postseason competition
indefinitely.180 CSUH obtained a preliminary injunction barring
the NCAA from enforcing its blanket declaration of postseason
ineligibility.181 On appeal by the NCAA, a California appellate
court affirmed, reasoning that CSUH was entitled to a
preliminary injunction so that the parties could litigate the
question whether the NCAA’s decision violated its own
constitution and bylaws.182 The appellate court observed that
courts will intervene in the internal affairs of a private association
when the association’s action is either contrary to its rules or not
authorized by its bylaws.183
175. Id. at 539.
176. See Trs. of Cal. State Univs. & Colls. v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461,
467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 469.
179. Hayward, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 539.
180. Id. at 537.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 540.
183. Id. at 539.
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Later, after a trial on the merits, the trial court issued a
permanent injunction in favor of CSUH, from which the NCAA
appealed.184 The appellate court affirmed.185 Like CSUH, the
appellate court interpreted the 1.6 rule to apply only to the
eligibility of institutions for postseason competition, not to that of
individual athletes for regular-season competition.186
The
appellate court construed the pertinent bylaw’s reference to
ineligibility for participation “in an NCAA-sponsored event” to
mean a postseason championship event, not a regular-season
contest.187 Thus, the appellate court concluded, the runner and
the baseball player had been eligible to compete for CSUH under
NCAA standards beginning in the spring semester of each one’s
freshman year in college, and CSUH did not violate an NCAA rule
in permitting them to do so.188 The permanent injunction would
stand because the NCAA had misread and misapplied its own
rule.189
C. Lessons for the Future
The import of the above cases for anyone contemplating a
challenge to the NCAA’s Restitution Rule is that, unless the
plaintiff can show that the Association’s action was illegal,
contrary to its own rules, or adverse to substantial economic
rights, courts will defer to its right to regulate its members’
athletic programs. Nevertheless, commentators have advocated
several methods of defanging the Restitution Rule, each of which
Part IV will identify before concluding that binding arbitration is
the best means to that end.
IV. ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF RESTITUTION

A. A Menu of Alternatives
The Restitution Rule’s harsh penalties and its tendency to
discourage athletes from seeking and institutions from honoring
184. Trs. of Cal. State Univs. & Colls. v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461, 465
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
185. Id. at 476.
186. Id. at 474–75.
187. Id. at 474.
188. Id. at 475.
189. Id. at 475–76.
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injunctions have spawned several suggestions for replacing it or,
at least, blunting its impact. Most of those suggestions would
require courts to change the standards by which they judge
disputes between the NCAA and college athletes.
One suggestion is that in such cases, courts should abandon
their traditional deference to the rights of private associations to
govern themselves because that rationale fails when applied to
college athletes, who are not members of the NCAA.190 This
reasoning echoes that of the Alabama Supreme Court in the Boyd
case, in which the court held:
[T]he general non-interference doctrine concerning
voluntary associations does not apply to cases involving
disputes between college athletes themselves and college
athletic associations . . . [because] the athlete himself is
not even a member of the athletic association [a
conference in this instance] . . . [and] has no voice or
bargaining
power
concerning
[its]
rules
and
regulations.191
Like the Boyd opinion, commentary advocating the end of judicial
deference to the NCAA argues that the associational-autonomy
rationale for such deference “is a red herring in the context of the
NCAA and student-athletes, as the rule of deference applies to
members, which the student-athletes are not.”192
This suggestion, if adopted, would leave the Restitution Rule
in place, but could reduce the likelihood of appellate court
reversals of injunctions favoring athletes, thereby limiting the
NCAA’s opportunities to invoke the rule. Without the deference
rationale, appellate courts would presumably be more likely to
affirm injunctions favoring athletes, thereby preventing the NCAA
from employing the Restitution Rule.
An alternative suggestion would eliminate the Restitution
Rule on the ground that it “[r]enders the court system
meaningless,” replacing it with heavy penalties (e.g., fines,
scholarship reductions, bans on postseason competition,
190. See T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual
Curveball at the NCAA’s ‘Veil of Amateurism,’ 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 187
(2010).
191. Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979).
192. Lockhart, supra note 190, at 187.
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suspensions of coaches, etc.) for institutions that use ineligible
players repeatedly.193 Still another suggestion is for courts “to
punish the NCAA until it directs members to follow the court’s
order.”194 According to this view, “[t]he NCAA could easily adopt
a simple rule that all members are required to follow valid court
orders issued against the NCAA.”195
Each of these suggestions is problematic. Presumably, courts
will not uniformly abandon their traditional deference to the
NCAA in its relations with college athletes anytime soon. Even if
some courts were to do so, others would not, leaving injunctions
more vulnerable to reversal and athletes more vulnerable to
imposition of the Restitution Rule in some jurisdictions than in
others. And even absent judicial deference to the NCAA, an
appellate court could still reverse an injunction in a particular
case, thereby triggering imposition of the Restitution Rule.
Eliminating the Restitution Rule and substituting major penalties
for repeat institutional offenders is flawed too. By the time the
penalties are imposed, the ineligible athlete may well have
graduated or exhausted eligibility, and the perhaps complicit
coach may have moved on as well, leaving innocent successors to
bear the burdens of the penalties. Finally, the NCAA, which has
not needed to invoke the Restitution Rule since 1976, is unlikely
to mothball its nuclear weapon by ordering its members to honor
court orders adverse to the Association.
B. The Best Choice: Binding Arbitration
Fortunately, a better substitute exists for the Restitution
Rule, one that will be less punitive to athletes and institutions
while serving the NCAA’s legitimate goal of discouraging its
members from using ineligible athletes in competition. The
proper substitute for the Restitution Rule is binding arbitration
conducted by professional arbitrators independent of the NCAA,
in the manner of professional sports leagues and the United
States Olympic Committee (“USOC”).196
Binding arbitration has several advantages over the NCAA’s
193.
194.
195.
196.

Morgan, supra note 95, at 313.
Johnson, supra note 16, at 507.
Id.
See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 82.
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current reinstatement procedure, potentially followed by a claim
for injunctive relief. First, arbitrators, unlike members of the
Reinstatement Committee, would be independent of the NCAA.
Members of the Reinstatement Committee owe their positions to
the NCAA, and athletes cannot participate in the appointment or
the removal of members, who serve three-year terms.197 In
contrast, under an arbitration scheme, the athlete and the NCAA,
as the parties, could consult with a case manager employed by the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) to identify the qualities
they desired in an arbitrator.198 The case manager would use the
information provided by the parties to compile a list of candidates,
from which the parties could either agree on a person or rank the
candidates to whom they did not object and then let the case
manager select the highest ranked candidate.199
Second, binding arbitration produces a result more quickly
than litigation can, which is why it is available with respect to the
time-sensitive eligibility and selection decisions that sports
governing bodies must make regarding Olympic athletes.200 In
the collegiate context, as in the Olympic setting, time is often of
the essence concerning eligibility determinations; hence
arbitration would be preferable to litigation in collegiate sports
too.201 In Olympic sports, the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act,202
enacted in 1978 and significantly amended in 1998, gives athletes
a statutory right to submit eligibility disputes to the AAA, which
results in independent, impartial review and a final decision that
is binding on the parties.203
197. See id. at 107 (citing NCAA, 2012–13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art.
21.7.7.3, at 364 (2012)).
198. See id. at 113.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 109.
201. See id.
202. 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2012).
203. See id. § 220529; Ross et al., supra note 16, at 111. Independent of
the Amateur Sports Act, since 1996, the International Olympic Committee
has required athletes wishing to compete in the Olympics to sign a waiver
form agreeing to bring all disputes before the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(“CAS”) and forego lawsuits. See Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic Binding
Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due
Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 997, 998
(2008). The form states: “The decisions of CAS shall be final, non-appealable
and enforceable. I shall not institute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or
seek any other form of relief in any other court or tribunal.” Melissa R.
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USOC Bylaw 9.7 also guarantees athletes whose claims
against sports governing bodies are not resolved to the athletes’
satisfaction access to binding arbitration.204 Another USOC
bylaw, 9.9, provides for expedited arbitration; when a competition
is fast approaching and a decision can not be reached in time
under the customary procedure, expedited arbitration produces a
decision within forty-eight hours of the claim having been filed.205
In such expedited reviews, the arbitrators are authorized to hear
and decide the claims under such procedures as are necessary but
still fair to the parties.206 Indeed, the main difference between
the binding arbitration provisions in the USOC bylaws and those
in the Amateur Sports Act is that the former apply to all disputes
brought by claimants, whereas the latter apply only to disputes
arising within twenty-one days of the start of an international
competition.207
Third, arbitration is generally less expensive, more private,
and more likely than litigation to feature a decision maker with
deep knowledge of the particular issues in question.208 In the
latter connection, all of the arbitrators employed by the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), which considers eligibility disputes
concerning the Olympics, the Paralympics, and the Pan American
Games, are not only trained lawyers, but also persons with deep
Bitting, Comment, Mandatory Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is
the Process Better or Worse for ‘Job Security’?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 663
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, BYLAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE § 9.7, at 40 (2014), available at http://www.teamusa.org/
Footer/Legal/Governance-Documents.
205. Id. § 9.9, at 40.
206. See id.
207. Compare 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a) (“In any lawsuit relating to the
resolution of a dispute involving the opportunity of an amateur athlete to
participate in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the PanAmerican Games, a court shall not grant injunctive relief against the
corporation within 21 days before the beginning of such games if the
corporation, after consultation with the chair of the Athlete’s Advisory
Council, has provided a sworn statement in writing executed by an officer of
the corporation to such court that its constitution and bylaws cannot provide
for the resolution of such dispute prior to the beginning of such games.”), with
U.S. OLYMPIC COMM. BYLAWS § 9.7, at 40. See also Bitting, supra note 203, at
663 (quoting Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports
Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT’L L. J. 527, 532 (1995)); Gubi, supra note 203, at
1022.
208. See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 112.
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experience in sports.209
Finally and most importantly, if binding arbitration were to
replace the NCAA’s current reinstatement process, athletes would
not seek injunctions to restore their eligibility because the
arbitrator’s decision would be final. Therefore, the Restitution
Rule would no longer be necessary to protect the Association’s
legitimate interest in discouraging its members from using
ineligible athletes.210 At the same time, athletes challenging an
NCAA declaration of ineligibility would know that the arbitrators
in their respective cases were entirely independent of the NCAA.
C. Arbitration in Action
Ideally, the NCAA would amend its bylaws to replace its
current athlete reinstatement process with an arbitration
mechanism.211 If the NCAA resists this change, Congress ought
to require it, perhaps as a condition precedent to conferring on the
Association a limited antitrust exemption.212 The exemption
would empower the NCAA to rein in the commercial excess of
major college sports without risking lawsuits from member
institutions or media outlets.213
209. See Bitting, supra note 203, at 673.
210. See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 113.
211. See id. at 112.
212. In recent years, several commentators have suggested that Congress
confer a limited antitrust exemption on the NCAA in exchange for requiring
the Association to enact reforms that would strengthen the link between
athletics and higher education. See generally PORTO, supra note 2 (discussing
the impact of two cases, National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) and National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), on the NCAA and collegiate
sports and proposing that congressional action be taken in order to ensure
the fairness and educational soundness of the administration of college
sports).
213. See generally Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory
Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic
Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 ORE. L. REV. 837, 857 (2014)
(arguing that, as opposed to other alternatives, reform of commercialized
collegiate athletics should focus on “creat[ing] programs designed to ensure
that student-athletes participating in big-time sports receive the fullest
opportunity to gain the benefits a college education can offer,” and the best
way to accomplish this is through an external regulatory commission); C.
Thomas McMillen, Could the Government End the Mess in College Sports?,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (August 15, 2014), http://chronicle.com/
article/Could-the-Government-End-the/148407/ (arguing that a congressional
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Regardless of how arbitration is applied to NCAA eligibility
disputes, the NCAA can use the arbitration provided for in the
Amateur Sports Act as a model.214 The Act authorizes arbitration
for athletes, coaches, trainers, managers, and officials215 whose
complaints against national sport governing bodies the USOC has
decided in favor of the governing bodies.216 The NCAA could
restrict arbitration to athletes whose institutions have declared
them ineligible for competition. The Act specifies that a party
seeking arbitration must submit its request within thirty days of
the USOC’s decision.217 No such timetable presently exists for
colleges and universities to seek reinstatement of athletes, but
under an arbitration model, the NCAA could establish a period of
time after the declaration of ineligibility for submitting an
arbitration request.218 Under the Amateur Sports Act, when the
AAA receives a demand for arbitration, the pertinent regional
office notifies the complainant, the sports governing body
involved, and the USOC.219 Similarly, a college athlete contesting
an eligibility decision could file a request for arbitration with the
AAA, which would then be required to notify the athlete, the
institution, and the NCAA that it had received the filing.
The Amateur Sports Act provides for three arbitrators per
hearing, unless the parties agree to fewer,220 to be held at a site
the AAA selects, unless the parties agree to a different site.221
These provisions would work well in the college sports context too
because they insure that the majority view of a panel prevails,

grant of an antitrust exemption to the NCAA would allow the Association to
rein in rampant spending and commercialism in college athletics in favor of
restoring academic integrity).
214. See 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a) (2012).
215. Id. § 220505(c)(5).
216. Id. § 220529(a).
217. Id. § 220529(b)(1).
218. See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.12.2, at 85–86 (“Any appeal to
restore a student athlete’s eligibility shall be submitted in the name of the
institution by the president or chancellor (or an individual designated by the
president or chancellor), faculty athletics representative, senior woman
administrator or athletics director.”); see supra text accompanying note 29
(explaining why the absence of a timetable for eligibility disputes is
inconvenient in the context of college athletics).
219. 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a).
220. Id. § 220529(b)(2)(a).
221. Id. § 220529(b)(2)(B).
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rather than one person’s view, and that neither party enjoys a
“home court advantage.” The Act also opens hearings to the
public.222 This requirement could be problematic in the collegiate
context, where the athletes are often still in their teens; sensitive
personal information can be involved, and public interest can be
intense.223 Accordingly, an arbitration hearing for a college
athlete should be closed to the public if the athlete so requests.
The Act provides that each party may have counsel present at the
hearing, which should apply in collegiate arbitration hearings
too.224
The Amateur Sports Act further provides that the arbitrators
may settle the dispute before making a final award, so long as the
parties agree and the settlement is consistent with the USOC’s
constitution and bylaws.225 This provision may seem unnecessary
in the collegiate context, where one party seeks an immediate
return to eligibility and the other favors continued ineligibility.
But in cases featuring a significant violation of NCAA rules, with
mitigating circumstances, both the athlete and the NCAA might
agree to a reduced period of ineligibility. Therefore, a settlement
option should exist in collegiate arbitration, just as it does in
Olympic arbitration.
Under the Amateur Sports Act, the arbitrators’ final decision
is binding on the parties, provided that decision is consistent with
the constitution and bylaws of the USOC.226 At any time before a
final decision is made, the hearing may be reopened, either by the
arbitrators, on their own motion, or on the motion of a party.227 If
a party’s motion prompts the reopening, and if that reopening
would result in the arbitrators’ decision being delayed beyond the
deadline agreed to at the start of the proceedings, all parties to the
decision must agree to reopen the hearing.228 Comparable
provisions would be advisable in the collegiate context, especially
one that renders the arbitrators’ decision binding so long as it does
222. Id. § 220529(b)(2)(C).
223. See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 112 (addressing the personal nature
of issues often involved in eligibility disputes and the impact of such issues
on lives of young athletes).
224. 36 U.S.C § 220529(b)(4).
225. Id. § 220529(c).
226. Id. § 220529(d).
227. Id. § 220529(e)(1).
228. Id. § 220529(e)(2).
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not violate the constitution and bylaws of the NCAA or is not void
as against public policy, such as by violating federal law. Those
two provisos would be the only permissible bases for challenging
the arbitrators’ decision in court.
V. CONCLUSION

The NCAA’s Bylaw 19.13, the Restitution Rule, is a punitive
relic of a paternalistic past in college sports, and it should give
way to binding arbitration, either at the NCAA’s own initiative or
at Congress’s insistence.
By subjecting individuals and
institutions to retroactive punishment when an athlete’s
successful claim for an injunction is reversed on appeal, the
Restitution Rule discourages athletes from pursuing legal relief
and institutions from honoring court-ordered injunctions. It also
potentially subjects an institution that honors an injunction, along
with the plaintiff athlete’s innocent teammates, to severe and
wholly undeserved retribution.
Several alternatives to the Restitution Rule exist, the best of
which is binding arbitration of athletic eligibility disputes using
the model provided by Olympic arbitration. Binding arbitration is
the best substitute because it would remove the prospect of
retroactive penalties by virtually eliminating the need for
injunctive relief in eligibility cases, while also protecting the
NCAA’s legitimate interest in barring ineligible athletes from
competition. Only by replacing the Restitution Rule with binding
arbitration can the NCAA punish the guilty, while protecting the
innocent, and respecting the American legal system.

